An 1862 Union Invasion of East Tennessee?

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Joe Meyer
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Joined: Thu Dec 31, 2009 12:17 pm

An 1862 Union Invasion of East Tennessee?

Post by Joe Meyer »

The closest thing Lincoln got to his long hoped for invasion of Eastern Tennessee in 1862 by Union forces was Carter's Raid, a brigade-sized cavalry thrust that struck the rail facilities at Strawberry Plains in the waning days of that year. Proir to that Buell had posted a small division at Cumberland Gap to keep an eye on the neighborhood; but it had been outmaneuvered and forced back by Kirby Smith's invasion of Kentucky. After Perryville Lincoln and Halleck had both pushed unsuccessfully upon first, Buell, and then, Rosecrans, to strike for Knoxville, taking the same route that Kirby Smith and Bragg had used on their retreat from Kentucky. But both Buell and Rosecrans pleaded that was the incorrect strategy to follow, citing primarily logistical concerns. Were those two Generals both right in refusing the movement? Or did Lincon and Halleck have it correct in stating that where the enemy had gone, so, too, could they?
General Jos. C. Meyer, ACWGC UA
Commander, Union Army of the Tennessee


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ianmillerni
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Joined: Wed Jul 07, 2010 10:27 am

Re: An 1862 Union Invasion of East Tennessee?

Post by ianmillerni »

Joe

There is a difference in falling back through an area you know is free of organised enemy, and advancing into one where the locals may be friendly, but there are active enemy.
In spring 1862 Jacob Cox Kanawha division was ordered to move 200 miles east from Ky into Western Virginia in support of Milroy and Shenck. He resisted, pointing out that his wagon teams could not operate so far from a supply base. In the absence of forage, the teams could haul a load equivalent to their own fodder for 17 days. That limited him to a radius of 8 days march into the mountains - and with the Union wagons averaging 14 miles/day on poor mountain roads, that was only 112 miles.
"living off the land" might work in populous northern Italy for Napoleon - although it turned the locals against him. A general store that might support an appalachian township all winter would be rations for a division for one day.
Sherman hit a well stocked part of Georgia just after harvest 1864.

You gotta have the teams, harnesses, and wagons to move rations.

It is an enduring Irish myth that the Brits exported grain from the north of Ireland during the potato famine which could have fed the starving in the south. Grain was indeed exported (to feed the starving in London), because it could be moved easily by sea. In 1847 there were no railways and few roads to move the grain into the west of Ireland, few harbours for the grain ships, and no flour mills to grind it on delivery - everything was geared to the potato.

Same today - you need a lot of trucks and diesel to move food and water to the starving in Africa or Pakistan.

(bit of a rant about logistics)

Ian
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